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A LINGUISTIC VIEW OF HABERMAS' THEORY
OF COMMUNICATIVE COMPETENCE
ELISABETH LEINFELLNER
839 South 15th Street
Lincoln, Nebraska 68508

Habermas'view of language has been widely discussed in Europe
and, to some extent, by rhetoricians and philosophers in the United
States. Here we will present the linguistic point of view.
Habermas' theory is heavily influenced by concepts taken from
hermeneutics and Habermas' own sociological views. For instance,
Habermas uses his concept of "systematic distortion" (i.e. ideological
distortion in a specific sense) and introduces it into the theory of communicative competence.
Habermas calls his view of language a "theory of communicative competence"; but even though he derives "competence" from
Chomsky's "linguistic competence," the former's concept of competence is not to be understood entirely in the sense of transformational
grammar.
In the theory of communicative competence, Habermas operates with the concept of a pragmatic truth-the "consensus theory of
truth," as he calls it-and what he calls "pragmatic universals." He
outlines the ideal speech situation which is the one to bring about
"true" consensus and which is free of external and internal coercion.
An ideal speech situation is characterized, among other things, by the
fact that the "roles" of the speakers are interchangeable, that there is
no systematic distortion, and so on.
Even from those few remarks, it becomes clear that Habermas
is not an empiricist, neither from the linguistic nor from the sociolo-

gical standpoint; and this is where part of the weakness of the entire
theory stems from and where linguistic criticism can start.

t t t
DISCUSSION
Habennas' theory of communicative competence (1971 :
101-141) has been widely discussed in Europe and, to a lesser
extent, in the United States. A philosopher's critique of the
theory of communicative competence unfolds in Bar-Hillel
(1973:1-11). Here we will present the linguistic point of
view.
Habennas begins by using the now famous discrimination between linguistic competence and linguistic perfonnance. Already, linguistic criticism could be a propos, because
psycholinguistic data have not wholly supported the differentiation between (innate) competence and perfonnance
(compare e.g. Jerome Bruner's address to the 21st International Congress of Psychology, Paris). Already a casual inspection of the speech behavior of children reveals that they are
not that linguistically competent. (This is exemplified nicely

by a little "school daze" joke-Note left on the teacher's
desk: ''Dear Teacher: I have written 'I have gone' a hundred
times, as you have told me. So now I have went home.")
But since the competence-perfonnance problem is the responsibility of the linguist or psycholinguist, one should not blame
the sociologist Habennas for not having solved it.
Habennas then introduces his own idea that the competence-perfonnance distinction has to be enlarged by the
concept that the general structures of possible speech situations can themselves be brought about by linguistic acts.
Those structures are said neither to belong to the extralinguistic conditions under which an utterance is uttered nor to
be identical with the linguistic entities that are produced by
means of linguistic competence. Their purpose is the pragmatic embedding of a speech or speech act (1971 :101).
It is obvious that Habennas, thus, aims either at the
philosophical distinction between utterance and sentence or
at the linguistic distinction between token sentence and type
sentence or at some other linguistic or philosophical distinction between the empirical and the theoretical level (e.g.,
word vs. lexeme, etc.). Habennas resorts to the utterancesentence distinction and creates some confusion by calling
utterances "situated sentences" and by speaking of sentences
as parts of speech acts, i.e. sentences as parts of specific
kinds of utterances. Although the distinction utterance-sentence has so far proven quite satisfactory, Habennas feels
himself compelled to introduce a four-fold distinction: 1) An
utterance is concrete, if it is uttered in a certain empirical
situation; its meaning is determined also by contingent factors
-by the personalities of the speaker and the listener and by
the roles they play in the society (1971 :106-107). A linguist
might say that at stage one connotation is important. According to Habennas, this concrete utterance is the subject matter
of what he calls empirical pragmatics, that is, psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics (1971 :108). The empirically minded
linguist will, nevertheless, ask: What about, for example,
statistical semantics, articulatory and acoustic phonetics,
lexicography, ...1 2) If we abstract from the variable elements
of a concrete utterance, then we obtain the elementary utterance, which is, according to Habermas, the pragmatic unit of
speech (1971 :107); it is obviously identical with a speech act
(1971 :104). The elementary utterance is the subject matter
of a discipline Habennas wishes to introduce and which he
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calls ''universal pragmatics" ("Universalpragmatik"; 1971:
108) or ''theory of communicative competence." 3) In a
second step we abstract from the performance and, thus,
retain the unit oflinguistics, the elementary sentence (1971:
107-108).4) By a fmal step of abstraction, where we do away
with the performative and other pragmatic linguistic elements
of stage three, we obtain another elementary unit: the propositional sentence or the elementary proposition ("elementare
Aussage"; 1971:107). The elementary proposition is usedaccording to Habermas-to reproduce states of affairs (''Sachverhalte"; 1971 :107); and according to him, it is predicate
logic that deals with the elementary proposition. It is to be
noted that we use ''proposition'' here as translation for "Aussage," not to be confused with the proposition as the platonistic meaning of a sentence.
There are various linguistic questions connected with
those three abstractions. Since Habermas does not, on the
one hand, tell us what those variable elements of stage one
are that are to be removed by abstraction in order to produce
the elementary utterance, or, on the other hand, why the
elementary utterances are still utterances, Le. something that
falls in the category of performance-we plainly do not know
what the elementary utterance is. Is it speech without the
"ahs" and ''urns,'' without gestures, without personal style
and personal mannerisms? Or is the third stage, won by abstraction from stage two, purely linguistic? If we interpret
Habermas here, we have to add that the elementary sentence is un-uttered by any empirical speaker. It seems to
me that Habermas takes here the concepts of generative grammar all too seriously (1971:107). The idea of restricting
linguistics to the study of elementary sentences-and elementary sentences only-is untenable, even if we do not consider
a linguistics of the Firthian type where, for example, meaning
is the whole complex of functions a linguistic form may have.
If we stick to Habermas' opinion on the subject matter of
linguistics, then linguistics never deals with empirical facts,
but with something that is already the result of a two~tep
abstraction. It is, however, linguistics, besides others, whichstarting with empirical discovery procedures-performs the abstraction from the concrete utterance to more theoretical
concepts like the lexeme, the type word, the moneme, or,
expressed more generally, to the level of the langue (de Saussure). This is the basis of structuralistic linguistics and of
linguistics as an empirical science as well. If we remove the
empirical basis of linguistics by removing the concrete and the
elementary utterance (the speech act), then linguistics severs
its connections with the empirical languages.
Stage two is characterized by the fact that so-<:alled
pragmatic universals become visible; Habermas calls them
"pragmatic universals" because they can be correlated with
universal structures of a speech situation, Le., the structure
that each speaker requires a listener (1971 :109). Looked
at closely, it seems that the pragmatic universals are of a
similar nature as the lexemes because Habermas simply presents them as a list of words and refuses to assign them to a
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meta-language (1971 :109). Under those circumstances, it
seems quite unnecessary to introduce three levels of abstraction and a specific science, called ''universal pragmatics" or
''theory of communicative competence."
Let us now have a linguistic look at the speech act (the
elementary unit of speech = the elementary utterance) as
conceived by Habermas. According to Habermas-who tries
to resort here to Austin and Searle-a speech act is always
composed of two "sentences" (we should better say: linguistic
elements, parts, etc.)-a performative "sentence" and a propositional "sentence." We have to add here that Habermas'
pragmatic universals can also be non -performative (i.e., deichtic ;
1971 :109). There is one exception to the division performative ''sentence''-propositional ''sentence'': institutionalized
speech acts do not have to contain a propositional "sentence"
(''1 thank you" / "I curse you"-Habermas' examples; 1971:
113). Here a strong idealization occurs because Habermas
assumes that all sentences, without exception, contain a
performative element, either empirically, or (still empirically
hypothetical) in a deep structure. If we take the standpoint
that linguistics is an empirical science, then the empirical
absence of something-e.g., the absence of "I know" from
"(that) the flower is red"-does not imply that we can simply
say: if it is not here, it is in the deep structure. By the way,
a problem of the same order arises when Habermas says that
institutionalized speech acts are dependent upon other speech
acts, which, as a rule, are not verbalized (1971 :113). This
is a serious empirical problem that, mutatis mutandis, also
plagues other sciences: Because the theory demands that there
is an empirical entity (e.g., a luminiferous ether), one assumes
it has to be someplace; and in linguistics, the most convenient
"someplace" is the deep structure.
A speech act thus divided in two parts can be further
characterized by the fact that the propositional content of the
propositional "sentence" stays the same when, for example,
questions are transformed into commands and commands
into confessions (1971 :106). It is not entirely clear what
Habermas means by ''propositional content," but it seems that
the propositional content is some platonistic or idealistic
meaning. If so, such a concept must be refused in empirical
linguistics where one substitutes either the empirical descriptive meaning for it or the meaning as used in the language. A
further empirical argument-and this argument also concerns
a good deal of today's linguistics-starts with the observation that, if nothing else changes when we ''transform'' (e.g.,
questions into commands), at least the syntactic structure of
the propositional "sentence" changes ("Are you leaving?";
"Leave!"; "I confess that I am leaving"; or better, perhaps: "I
confess that 1 left."). One could now put forth a hypothesis:
1) The syntactic change indicates a change in meaning, a view
supported by certain findings in historical linguistics. This
reverses, of course, the relationship between syntax and·
semantics as it is usually conceived, or it gives at least syntax
a semantic aspect; 2) We could draw the conclusion that the
two utterances-''The water is running" and "I believe the

water is running"-do not share a common "element" of
meaning, namely, the meaning of "the water is running,"
but that they are two linguistic entities with two different
semantic structures. Wittgenstein has argued that in the
examples, "I expect he is coming" and "He is coming," ''he
is coming" has in both instances the same meaning because
our hopes can be fulfilled (I 953: 130e, § 444). But what about
hopes that can never be fulfilled because they belong to some
never-never land? And what about the examples, "I dreamt
that the cows ate square roots" and ''The cows ate square
roots," where the latter is in conflict with current (English)
language use and thus meaningless in language-immanent
semantics as well as in empirical. One could imagine that
the first case-"(that) the cows ate square roots"-has some
meaning, although no empirical meaning. It is obvious that
a meaningful and a meaningless sentence or part of a sentence
cannot have the same meaning. It would be preferable to say,
first, that in the case of the example given by Wittgenstein,
the sameness of meaning is accidental or fictitious as long as
we are on the language-immanent level and, second, that we
have to stress that such questions cannot be solved solely by a
semantics where meaning appears as a language-immanent
use of the language; we also have to apply an empirical descriptive semantics.
Despite the recent criticism that has been heaped upon
interpretative semantics, it seems that a refmed interpretative
semantics (minus the mentalism ! la Katz) or a structural
semantics could deal with those problems most adequately.
(One should not forget that a good deal of computer semantics
is interpretative; compare, for example, Wilks, 1972, and
Minsky, 1968.) On a language-immanent level, the ontological
abyss between intension and extension (one of the characteristics of an empirical descriptive semantics-or, in Habermas'
terms, the distinction between the performative "sentence"
and the propositional "sentence") would be diminished or
take another shape. For example, the difference between "I
see that those flowers are red" and "I believe that those flowers are red" would not lie in the fact that the first sentence is
intentional and the second assertive, butin the fact that "see"
and "believe" associate-according to present (English, German, ...) language-use with different sets of words.
Those considerations are essential for Habermas' theory
of communicative competence also for another reason: He
uses a consensus theory of truth rather than a correspondence
theory, an issue which is a philosophical one and which
we are, therefore, not going to discuss here.
The last problem we are going to deal with is the problem of Habermas' ideal speech situation. He states the following: 1) The significance of a speech act lies in the fact that
two people act in agreement or communicate about something; 2) Communication means the bringing about of true
consensus. For Habermas' concept of true consensus, we refer
to Habermas' writings themselves, since true consensus is
not a linguistic problem; 3) True consensus can be dis-

criminated from false consensus only with reference to an
ideal or idealized speech situation, i.e., agreement is to be
reached under ideal conditions which Habermas says are
counterfactual (1971 :136). The serious empirical linguist
begins to wonder that perhaps a counterfactual condition of
an empirical speech act is a contradictio in adiecto. It's as if a
physicist would say: Perform this mechanical experiment in
the open air under the (counterfactual) condition that there
is no air friction. Habermas justifies the idealization of a
speech act and its ideal preconditions by saying that this is
an anticipation ("Vorgriff"; 1971 :136 ff.); this reminds us
of hermeneutic philosophy. In hermeneutic philosophy,
however, one has to justify one's anticipations by means of
that which follows, be that which follows the interpretation
of a given text or a series of actions or speech acts. But since
the anticipation here is counterfactual, it can never be justified, and is, therefore, not even an heuristic device.
A speech situation is ideal if it is neither hampered by
external, extra-linguistic circumstances (e.g., political ones),
or by internal, linguistic circumstances; the latter includes the
absence of what Habermas calls ''systematic distortion"
("systematische Verzerrung"; 1971 :137). According to
Habermas, a systematic distortion does not imply that one is
deceived by means of language, but that language in itselffor example, ideological language-is deceptive. This presupposes that, in the case of political, ideological language as
a medium of power and social control, its ideological character is not revealed by those in power (1970:287). If we
read in a philosophical dictionary that socialist democracy
originates and develops together with the working class'
rise to political power and with the establishment of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, then we know that this must
be a dictionary compiled by a Marxist (Klaus and Buhr,
1964: 102b). But is this explication of "democracy" really
distorted and-if it is distorted-distorted in comparison
to what? A ''western'' explication of "democracy"? But
"democracy," as the word already implies, practically always
justifies power and is, thus, always ideological. Therefore,
from a linguist's standpoint, we could say, with like credence,
that a ''western'' explication of democracy is systematically
distorted compared to a Marxist one, if-and only if-the
Marxist and the "western" use of language have been firmly
established and the denotations have been agreed upon. The
linguist can do nothing else but state a change of meaning in
case the ''western'' and the "Marxist" basic languages are
essentially the same, as is the case in East and West Germany.
"Democracy" in different languages can be compared only
with great difficulty. Otherwise, the linguist has to resort to
the venerable but false notion that some speech shows "true"
meanings, whereas other forms of speech do not. Language
itself has to be considered as a neutral vehicle, quite innocent
of all the crimes it has been blamed for, including ideological
distortion.
Essentially, Habermas argues that the structure of communication itself produces no coercion when-and only
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when-for all communicators there is a symmetrical distribution of chances to select speech acts and to perfonn them.
Then, the roles played by the participants in a dialogue can be
exchanged, and the communicators will be ~ a state of equality with respect to the performing of roles in a dialogue
(1971 :137). If this is an idealization, it does not add anything to the improvement of our speech acts since it is said
to be counterfactual. And if we remove the counterfactuality
of this statement and apply it to empirical speech situations,
we will see that-in most instances-it is plainly false. Language
conceived in such a way would be partly reduced to the
symmetrical exchange of pleasantries or of infonnations about
well established facts, where the persuasive power of speech
plays no role; in general rhetoric as the art of persuasion would
have to disappear. Another possibility is what we might call
a "theorizing" dialogue, i.e., a dialogue where people try to
reason together and where the symmetrical distribution of
chances to select and perfonn speech acts is preserved. Such a
dialogue would be evenly flowing and would appear as if
staged. If we try to give an example of such a dialogue, we
might think of the staged dialogues of Plato or of Galilei's
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. But a
closer look at, for example, the Platonic Cratylus reveals
that Cratylus' contributions to the dialogue are often reduced
to "Yes"; ''No; I do not"; ''Certainly''; "What do you mean?";
"Most assuredly"; whereas Socrates plays a dominating and
domineering role. This is, of course, even more so in real life.
Speech situations as conceived by Habennas would presuppose that all men are not only equal before the law and with
respect to their chances in society (and even those two equalities exist empirically only in a restricted fonn), but that they
are also equal with respect to their intellectual capabilities,
their linguistic fluency, their wit, etc., and that they are all
dispassionate, even apathetic. Thus, speech is almost always
asymmetrical, due to the differences in the nature of men,
and because of the practical demand of avoiding excessive
expenses and excessive amounts of time and nerves.
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